EU Tax Reform Proposal Faces Scrutiny Over Revenue Asymmetry and Legal Clarity

The following is an adaptation of the written testimony submitted by Martha Caziero, Head of Policy at Tax Foundation Europe, to the European Commission.

As the European Union continues its ongoing push to bolster economic growth and cross-border competitiveness, fiscal policymakers across member states are closely examining the European Commission’s comprehensive Tax Omnibus proposal. The legislative package touches on several foundational elements of EU corporate taxation, raising critical questions about how tax burdens are distributed, how double taxation is prevented, and how far Brussels can go in harmonizing rules across national borders.

Tax Foundation Europe recently submitted its official review of selected issues within the proposal to the European Commission. The organization’s primary mission focuses on developing rigorous research and educating policymakers on tax matters that directly impact the growth and competitiveness of the European Union’s single market. While the review does not cover every technical facet of the omnibus package, it offers a deep dive into two major areas carrying profound implications for the bloc’s economic trajectory: the proposed elimination of holding requirements under the Parent-Subsidiary and Interest and Royalty directives, and the shifting nature of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive as either a minimum protection standard or a tool for rigid harmonization.

Rethinking Holding Requirements in EU Tax Directives

At the heart of the first major debate is the elimination of existing holding thresholds from the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (PSD) and the Interest and Royalty Directive (IRD). Under current rules, companies must meet specific ownership criteria to qualify for exemptions from withholding taxes on cross-border dividend, interest, and royalty payments. Specifically, the PSD requires a parent company to hold at least 10 percent of a subsidiary’s shares, while the IRD requires associated companies to be connected by at least 25 percent shareholding.

When shareholdings fall beneath these thresholds, member states retain the sovereign freedom to levy withholding taxes on cross-border payments, subject to broader EU treaty obligations. The Commission’s new proposal aims to abolish these thresholds entirely. Consequently, member states would no longer be permitted to levy withholding taxes on cross-border payments directed toward portfolio investments—those sitting below the traditional 10 percent and 25 percent markers.

National governments have voiced substantial concerns regarding this shift. Many argue that the amendment fundamentally transforms the purpose of the PSD and IRD. Originally designed to facilitate corporate grouping and restructuring within the European Union, the directives would, under the new proposal, effectively act as a mechanism for reallocating taxing rights among member states. Because such a reallocation would impact national budgets unevenly, the proposal risks triggering significant asymmetrical fiscal effects across the bloc.

The Persistence of Definitive Double Taxation on Portfolio Investments

Under the status quo, shareholdings outside the protected statutory thresholds remain vulnerable to outbound withholding taxes levied by source countries. For dividend income, this dynamic can result in severe economic friction, including the risk of triple taxation. First, corporate profits are taxed under the corporate income tax regime of the distributing company’s state of residence. Second, the receiving company may face taxation in that same source state on the distributed amount. Third, those same dividends enter the receiving company’s domestic tax base, triggering a third layer of corporate income taxation in its home country.

For interest and royalty income, juridical double taxation is similarly common. The paying company’s state typically levies a withholding tax on the outbound payment, and the receiving company must subsequently incorporate those receipts into its corporate taxable income in its state of residence.

Although EU fundamental freedoms and bilateral double tax conventions (DTCs) impose constraints on national tax authorities, they do not entirely eliminate these frictions. EU law mandates that member states treat resident and non-resident taxpayers comparably when they find themselves in similar situations. For dividends, this principle strictly limits a member state’s ability to levy outbound withholding taxes if domestic dividends enjoy exemptions or credits. For interest and royalties, however, the legal boundaries are wider because these payments generally represent deductible expenses for payers and ordinary income for recipients, leaving room for ongoing juridical double taxation.

Bilateral double tax treaties also place caps on withholding rates and mandate that residence states grant foreign tax credits. Yet, these treaties frequently fail to resolve complex cross-border scenarios, such as triangular multi-country arrangements or divergent legal interpretations between contracting states. Furthermore, even when tax relief or credits are legally available, the administrative costs and lengthy time lags associated with claiming refunds for over-withheld taxes act as a measurable deterrent to cross-border investment, dampening the efficiency of the internal market.

Addressing the Fiscal Asymmetry Across Member States

The debate over the omnibus proposal largely centers on its uneven revenue impact. Because capital-exporting nations traditionally provide credits for foreign withholding taxes, while capital-importing countries retain the direct revenue collected at source, eliminating withholding taxes creates clear winners and losers. Eurostat balance of payments data indicates that net exporters of portfolio investments include countries such as Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium, whereas nations like Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands, and Ireland function as net importers.

To mitigate the revenue shortfalls feared by capital-importing member states, policymakers have proposed practical compensation mechanisms. One viable approach draws inspiration from the repealed EU Savings Directive, which utilized a revenue-sharing model. Under a newly structured revenue-sharing clause, capital-exporting countries that experience a fiscal windfall from no longer needing to grant foreign tax credits could transfer a portion of those gains directly to capital-importing nations facing lost revenue at source.

Because tracking every individual transaction would create an administrative nightmare, experts suggest employing a statistical formula. This formula would approximate annual returns on aggregate equity and debt assets held across borders, applying standardized rates—such as a benchmark calculated from average domestic corporate tax structures for dividends, and average treaty rates for interest and royalties—to determine fair fiscal transfers. Alternatively, these redistributed amounts could be treated as a genuine EU own resource, helping finance common EU expenditures while leaving capital-exporting countries broadly revenue-neutral compared to the status quo.

Blurring the Boundaries of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive

Beyond withholding taxes, the proposal introduces considerable legal ambiguity regarding the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD). Historically, Article 3 of the ATAD established that the directive serves strictly as a minimum standard of protection for national tax bases, allowing member states to enact stricter domestic anti-avoidance rules provided they comply with EU treaties.

However, the new omnibus text muddies this principle. Provisions concerning controlled foreign company (CFC) rules and interest limitations contain mandatory language—such as "Member States shall"—without explicitly clarifying whether national governments retain the freedom to implement more rigorous domestic standards. This lack of legal certainty undermines the core harmonization goals of the directive, threatening legal predictability for businesses operating across multiple jurisdictions.

Experts suggest that EU legislators must explicitly clarify the scope of these provisions by amending Article 3 to state that the directive establishes a minimum standard "unless otherwise provided," thereby drawing a clear legal line between mandatory minimum floors and exhaustive maximum harmonization rules.

Harmonizing Research and Development Full Expensing

A similar tension surrounds the proposal’s introduction of a mandatory R&D full expensing provision, which requires member states to allow businesses to immediately deduct qualifying research and development capital expenditures from their taxable base. While framed as a minimum harmonization measure—permitting member states to maintain more generous domestic incentives—governments remain uncertain about how to legally assess equivalence.

Because traditional depreciation schedules erode the real value of investment deductions over time due to inflation and the time value of money, full expensing significantly lowers the cost of capital and stimulates innovation. However, because EU member states deploy a wide variety of existing R&D tax incentives, establishing a clear economic benchmark—such as the net present value of deductions provided—is essential to ensure that national alternatives genuinely match or exceed the standard set by Brussels, safeguarding both the internal market and the legal basis of the directive.

The ongoing discussions in the Council will prove decisive in shaping whether the omnibus proposal successfully enhances the EU’s global competitiveness without deepening fiscal divides among member states.

In This Category: Tax Planning & Fiscal Policy

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